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Abstract. by focussing on the logical relations between scientific theories and 
religious beliefs in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies (2011), Alvin Plantinga 
overlooks the real conflict between science and religion. This conflict exists 
whenever religious believers endorse positive factual claims to truth concerning 
the supernatural. They thereby violate an important rule (r) of scientific method 
and of common sense, according to which (seriously disputed) factual claims 
should be endorsed as (approximately, probably, etc.) true only if they result 
from validated epistemic methods or sources.
I. INTroDuCTIoN
The question as to how science and religion are related should be of 
interest to all of us. Well-educated people living in the twenty-first 
century will endorse a  world-view that is deeply influenced by the 
results of scientific and scholarly investigations. Can a religious creed be 
integrated properly into such a Weltanschauung, or, vice versa, can one 
incorporate all scientific results into a religious world-view? For instance, 
are Jewish, Christian, muslim, or mormon monotheistic beliefs about 
God and the world still intellectually acceptable in our age of science? 
There is no consensus concerning this issue, and the various possible 
answers have implications for many aspects of society and human life.
Consequently, a  definitive analysis of the interrelations between 
science and religion developed by a  major Christian philosopher 
deserves serious attention. In his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, 
published in 2011 (referred to as WCrl), Alvin Plantinga defends 
two complementary and thought-provoking claims, to wit: (a) ‘there is 
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superficial conflict but deep concord between science and theistic religion’, 
whereas (b) there is ‘superficial concord and deep conflict between science 
and naturalism’.1 In this article, I shall contest the first conjunct of (a), 
that is, the thesis that there is (merely) a  superficial conflict between 
science and theistic religion.
As I shall argue, the conflict between science and religion is profound 
indeed, and it is only by his narrow focus on logical conflicts that 
Plantinga might be able to seduce his readers into thinking otherwise. 
of course, if I am right that there is a deep conflict between science and 
religion, that is, at least between science and theistic religion as Plantinga 
conceives of it, the second conjunct of Plantinga’s first thesis (a) must be 
false as well. I also think that the second conjunct of (b), the idea that 
there is a deep conflict between science and naturalism, is completely 
mistaken, as has been argued by many critics of Plantinga, but I shall not 
dive into the deep waters of this brainteaser here.2
let me start (§2) by commenting on one of Plantinga’s arguments 
for the first conjunct of (a). In §3, I develop the view that there is a deep 
conflict between science and traditional religion, and I explicate the term 
‘science’ for the present context. This deep conflict raises the question as 
to how educated and intelligent people living in the twenty-first century 
can still reasonably endorse the tenets of a religion such as Christianity 
or Islam (§4).3 Contemporary religious believers have four options with 
regard to this issue, which I schematize as the end-nodes of a decision 
tree. one of these options has been developed by Alvin Plantinga 
as a  conditional A/C (Aquinas-Calvin) model of a  sensus divinitatis 
supplemented by an ‘Internal Instigation of the Holy spirit’. If this model 
were adequate, ‘the full panoply of Christian belief ’ might amount to 
knowledge for (some?) Christians even in the absence of any supporting 
arguments, since this panoply would probably consist of warranted 
properly basic beliefs, at least if the Christian god exists.4 I shall argue, 
however, that there also is a deep conflict between this model and science 
in the sense in which science is properly characterized (§5).
1 Plantinga (2011: ix) (Plantinga’s italics).
2 Cf., for example, Fales (1996), beilby (2002), Plantinga & Tooley (2008), Childers 
(2011), and law (2012).
3 The central question of Plantinga was whether Christian belief is still intellectually 
acceptable for ‘educated and intelligent people living in the twenty-first century’ (2000: 
viii).
4 The quote is from Plantinga (2000: 241, 357, 499).
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II. loGICAl CoNFlICTs
In Parts I and II of WCrl, Alvin Plantinga argues that either there is 
no conflict at all between science and religion, or, if there is a conflict, 
it is only ‘weak’ or ‘superficial’ in the sense that scientific results do not 
(tend to) provide religious (Christian) believers with defeaters for their 
beliefs.5 The notion of conflict he employs is a  logical one in a  broad 
sense: there is a ‘conflict’ between p and q if and only if p contradicts q, or 
if q is ‘massively improbable’ given p and background beliefs.6 since such 
logical conflicts can only obtain between (sets of) propositions, Plantinga 
focuses on relations between religious beliefs and scientific theories in his 
discussion of possible conflicts between science and religion.
more specifically, he argues that Darwinism is logically compatible 
with the idea of a divinely guided evolution (Ch. 1-2), that a belief in 
miracles is consistent both with Newtonian mechanics or classical science 
(Ch. 3) and with quantum mechanics (Ch. 4), and that even though there 
may be logical incompatibilities between Christian beliefs on the one 
hand and some results of Historical biblical Criticism or explanations 
of religion by evolutionary psychologists on the other hand (Ch. 5), the 
latter do not defeat the former (Ch. 6). let me comment on the issue of 
Darwinism only, in order to show that Plantinga’s preoccupation with 
logical relations between articles of faith and scientific theories conceals 
from view the profound conflict between science and religion (cf. §3).
Chapters 1 and 2 of WCrl are devoted to the question of whether 
there is a logical conflict between on the one hand evolutionary theory, 
specifically the Darwinist doctrine that the process of descent with 
modification is driven by the natural mechanism of (mostly) natural 
selection operating on heritable random genetic mutations, and on the 
other hand the Christian doctrine that God has created human beings 
in his image.7 of course (neo-) Darwinism clearly contradicts many 
5 Cf. Plantinga (2011: xiii and 180) for these (slightly diverging) definitions of a weak 
or superficial conflict.
6 Plantinga (2011: 143-4). more may be needed to make such a conflict ‘interesting’ 
(ibidem).
7 Plantinga (2011: 9ff., 34ff.). of course, chance plays a large role in the selection process 
as well. As ernst mayr (2001: 156) stresses, ‘potentially favorable gene combinations are 
undoubtedly often eliminated by indiscriminate environmental forces such as floods, 
earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions before natural selection has had the opportunity to 
favor specific genotypes’ . Furthermore, in sexual species, the major source of variation is 
the process of sexual reproduction.
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details of the creation stories told in Genesis, if interpreted literatim. but 
scientifically informed Christians have been quick to point out that the 
(mutually inconsistent) creation stories should not be taken literally, as 
theologians had argued earlier on other grounds. Plantinga approvingly 
quotes the Princeton theologian Charles Hodge, who wrote in 1871 that 
if God created plants, animals, and men, ‘it makes no difference how He 
made them, as far as the question of design is concerned, whether at once 
or by a  process of evolution’.8 Could God not have ‘guided’ evolution, 
Plantinga suggests, by causing ‘the right mutations to arise at the right 
time’, by preserving ‘populations from perils of various sorts, and so on’?9 
of course one might add less pleasant speculations in a  similar vein. 
Could God not have caused the Cretaceous-Paleogene extinction event 
some 65.5 million years ago, which killed off the non-avian dinosaurs, 
by steering a giant asteroid towards earth? If He wanted to create man 
in his image, as Plantinga avers, God had good reasons for guiding the 
lethal asteroid towards our planet, because given the actual course of 
evolution, the extinction of these dinosaurs was a necessary condition 
for the possibility of human’s evolving.10
Plantinga stresses repeatedly that there is no logical conflict 
whatsoever between neo-Darwinism and the thesis that God guided 
the evolution of life on earth, because the thesis that evolution is 
undirected, unguided, non-teleological, or unorchestrated by God (or 
anyone else) allegedly is ‘a philosophical gloss or add-on to the scientific 
doctrine of evolution’, which does not belong to the theory itself.11 In 
order to evaluate this surprising claim, one should distinguish more 
clearly than Plantinga does between three different questions: (a) is the 
unguidedness-thesis part of the standard theory of neo-Darwinism (the 
modern evolutionary synthesis)? (b) Does the existing evidence support 
the unguidedness-thesis? And (c): is it logically possible that given the 
available evidence, evolution is nevertheless directed by someone?
Concerning (a) it is surprising that Plantinga in 2011 still quotes 
Hodges’ book of 1871. As is well known, after the publication of Darwin’s 
8 Plantinga (2011: 11); with reference to Hodge (1871, no page number indicated).
9 Plantinga (2011: 11; cf. pp. 16, 39-40, 46, 56, 116 &c).
10 Cf. on the thesis that God created man in his image, Plantinga (2011), passim, see 
under Imago dei in his index. And cf. for similar objections by Darwin to Asa Gray: 
beatty (2006: 639).
11 Plantinga (2011: xii, 39, 46, 55, 63, 308-9).
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The Origin of Species in 1859, there were many attempts to defend 
Darwinism from the charge that it promoted atheism. The American 
botanist Asa Gray argued in his Darwiniana of 1876, like Plantinga, that 
the theory of evolution is neutral on the question whether evolution is 
ultimately designed. might the Creator not direct mutations in ways that 
are beneficial to a species? but in letters to Gray and in the Conclusion to 
his Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication of 1868, Darwin 
stressed that this hypothesis is antagonistic to his evolutionary theory.12 
If genetic variation could be guided in a  beneficial direction, natural 
selection would be superfluous, so that the internal logic or economy of 
the theory excludes the idea that mutations are somehow orchestrated.13 
by the end of the 19th century, most professional biologists were con-
vinced on many grounds that theistic evolutionism is a  non-starter.14 
Accordingly, it is a central tenet of the modern evolutionary synthesis 
that genetic mutations occur ‘by chance’ or ‘at random’ in the sense of not 
being directed toward the adaptive needs of the organisms concerned or 
of the populations to which they belong, and that natural selection is not 
goal-directed either, as is stressed in contemporary textbooks.15
If this is the case, how can Plantinga seriously claim that the 
unguidedness-thesis is not part of neo-Darwinism but rather a  ‘philo-
sophical gloss or add-on’? How can he drive a wedge between ‘random’ 
and ‘unguided’?16 He does so in two steps, which he buttresses by quotes 
from ernst mayr and elliott sober, respectively. The quote from mayr 
shows that the ‘randomness’ of mutations does not mean that they are 
uncaused or ‘just a matter of chance’:
When it is said that mutation or variation is random, the statement 
simply means that there is no correlation between the production of 
new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a  given 
environment.17
12 Darwin (1868: 236).
13 Cf. also bowler (1989: 224): ‘Darwin doubted that any theologian would want to 
attribute such horrors to a process directly supervised by God.’ Cf. for Darwin’s discussion 
with Gray: beatty (2006).
14 Cf. bowler (1989: 222-226).
15 Cf. ridley (2004: 88-89); mayr (2001: 133-4); simpson (1984 [1944]: 55-56); 
Dobzhansky et al. (1977: 66). Cf. merlin (2010: 2ff.) for a conceptual analysis of various 
formulations. Plantinga (2011) quotes mainly Dawkins (p. 14) and Dennett (p. 34).
16 Cf. boudry (2012: 1).
17 Plantinga (2011: 11), and mayr (1988: 98).
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According to Plantinga, sober ‘puts the point a bit more carefully’ because 
he stresses that there is no natural mechanism that directs mutations in 
adaptive directions:
There is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of 
them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those 
mutations to occur.18
From these quotes Plantinga concludes correctly that the mutations 
being ‘random in that sense is clearly compatible with being caused by 
God’.19 However, it does not follow, and is in fact contradicted by the 
quote from mayr (unless one restricts the meaning of this quote à la 
sober to the absence of physical guiding mechanisms), that randomness 
in the evolutionary sense is also logically compatible with being guided 
by God, if at least ‘guided’ means that mutations are somehow directed 
towards new adaptations, or to the development of new species. And 
what else should it mean?
Clearly, then, the thesis that evolution is unguided is an integral part 
of the modern evolutionary synthesis, and Plantinga’s argument to the 
effect that the thesis is ‘a philosophical gloss or add-on’ to this theory is 
a non-sequitur.20 As mark ridley stresses in his textbook on evolution, 
‘[i]t is one of the most fundamental claims in the Darwinian theory of 
evolution that natural selection is the only explanation for adaptation’.21
Concerning (b), the issue as to whether the existing evidence supports 
the thesis that mutations are random, not in the sense of ‘uncaused’ but 
in the sense of ‘unguided to future adaptation’, one should admit that 
the empirical evidence supporting this claim is overwhelming, and 
that it is sensible to generalize from such consistent findings.22 Yet this 
randomness thesis cannot mean that, for example, specific types of 
mutations all have the same probability of being beneficial, deleterious, 
18 Plantinga (2011: 12), with reference to sober, ‘evolution Without metaphysics?’, 
probably the draft of ‘evolution without Naturalism’, in Jonathan l. Kvanvig, ed. (2011: 
187-221) (no date or page indicated by Plantinga).
19 Plantinga (2011: 12) (last italics mine).
20 This is the consensus view, as Plantinga (2011: 12) admits; cf. merlin (2010) for 
a defence of this view against scientific critics. Cf. monton & Gage (2012) for another 
criticism of Plantinga’s argument. one should diagnose Plantinga’s fallacy as a fallacy of 
ambiguity, because he confuses ‘uncaused’ with ‘unguided’.
21 ridley (2004: 256) (my italics). ridley explicitly excludes theistic explanations.
22 Cf. merlin (2010) for an overview and answers to criticisms based on the discovery 
of mutator mechanisms.
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or neutral. For example, small genetic mutations have a greater chance 
of being adaptive than larger ones, which tend to be deleterious or 
lethal, as sir ronald Fisher showed mathematically.23 Furthermore, new 
adverse environmental conditions, such as temperature change, might 
cause a  global increase of mutation rate, thereby also increasing the 
probability that beneficial mutations occur within a given period. And 
the probability of mutations of different types is unequal both across the 
genome and at a particular genomic site. No genetic mutation is random 
in the mathematical sense that it is equally probable as any other genetic 
mutation or no mutation. What the randomness thesis does mean is 
that ‘there is no specific causal connection between the probability of 
a mutation being beneficial (in a given environment) and the probability 
of it occurring (in this environment)’.24
As regards (c), it is trivially true that because our evidence is limited 
in principle, it is always logically possible that there are hidden variables, 
which are still undetected or even undetectable. For example, our available 
evidence concerning the Cretaceous-Paleogene extinction event does 
not contradict the hypothesis that God caused it by steering an asteroid 
towards earth. but why should we accept such a gratuitous speculation? 
A  mere logical possibility does not warrant a  factual assertion, and if 
someone claims that he knows this by means of an ‘Internal Instigation of 
the Holy spirit’, we should respond with a shrug. This appropriate reaction 
directs our attention to the really profound conflict between science and 
religion, which is not (primarily) a conflict in the narrow logical sense of 
a contradiction or a low likelihood, as I shall argue in section 3.
Finally, combining issues (a) and (c) one might even show that 
in a  sense there is no contradiction between neo-Darwinism and 
the theistic doctrine of guided evolution, in spite of the fact that 
Plantinga’s own argument to this effect is a non sequitur.25 even though 
mathematical models of evolutionary processes concerning changes 
in trait frequency may look deterministic if one assumes that they 
are applied to infinite populations, all real populations are finite. As 
a consequence, neo-Darwinism, if conceived of merely as a set of such 
mathematical models or equations, becomes a probabilistic theory when 
23 Fisher 1999 [1930], referred to by merlin (2010: 4).
24 merlin (2010: 6).
25 The argument that follows in the main text has been developed in detail by sober 
(forthcoming). Cf. also sober (2010) and (2011), Chapter 4.
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applied to real populations. Instead of predicting what will happen in the 
future given a description of the present state of a population, the models 
assign probabilities to different scenarios. And since these probability 
statements (likelihoods) may be true even though their antecedents 
do not provide causally complete descriptions of populations and 
their ecological niches, they do not logically exclude the presence 
of causally relevant factors that are ‘hidden’ in the sense that they are 
not mentioned in the applied mathematical models of evolutionary 
theory. of course, this argument holds for any probabilistic theory, and 
Plantinga uses a  similar argument for the conclusion that there is no 
contradiction between quantum mechanics and the thesis that miracles 
have occurred.26 In other words, Plantinga might correctly claim that 
in a  sense there is no contradiction between neo-Darwinism (that is: 
between the mathematical evolutionary models as applied to finite 
populations) and the thesis of guided evolution, even though in the 
ordinary sense of neo-Darwinism his claim is clearly false.27
This result leads us to the central question of this paper. Would the 
thesis that there is no contradiction between neo-Darwinism (in the sense 
just explained) and the doctrine of divinely guided evolution imply that 
at this point there is no profound conflict between science and religion? 
let us generalize our query. suppose that there is no contradiction or 
other logical conflict between any scientific theory that we now endorse 
on the basis of the existing evidence on the one hand, and the central 
doctrines of a  specific religion such as Christianity, provided that the 
latter are interpreted properly, on the other hand. Does this really show 
that there is no profound conflict between science and Christianity? In 
other words, are logical relations of incompatibility (contradiction, or 
improbability of p given q and background beliefs) the only or even the 
main kinds of conflict that are relevant here? As I shall argue in the next 
section, the deep conflict between science and religion lies elsewhere, 
so that Plantinga’s nearly exclusive preoccupation with logical conflicts 
amounts to an ignoratio elenchi.
26 Plantinga (2011: 92ff.).
27 I would argue, however, that neo-Darwinism is more than a set of equations. sober’s 
motive for developing the argument I just summarized is that he wants ‘to take the heat 
off evolutionary theory’. As he says, ‘The more evolutionary theory gets called an atheistic 
theory, the greater the risk that it will lose its place in public school biology courses in the 
united states’ (sober, forthcoming: p. 15 of the manuscript).
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III. THe reAl CoNFlICT
In order to detect where the profound conflict between science and 
religion really lies, an historical perspective on their interrelations from 
the scientific revolution in the 17th century onwards is instructive. one 
arbitrarily selected example will show what I mean.28
During the 16th and 17th centuries, numerous european scholars 
attempted to calculate on the basis of biblical chronologies when exactly 
the ‘beginning’ had been in which God created ‘the heavens and the 
earth’.29 The challenging textual and mathematical complexities of this 
endeavour explain the fact that the results they published diverged 
considerably. some 200 or more substantial publications appeared, 
and their estimates of the year of the earth’s (or the world’s) divine 
creation varied between 6000 bC and 2700 bC. For example, whereas 
Heinrich bullinger (1504-1575) concluded that the earth started to 
exist in 3004 bC, Thomas Allen (1608-1673) argued in his 1659 book 
A Chain of Scripture Chronology that its creation took place in 3934 bC. 
As William Nisbit observed in A Scripture Chronology of 1655, there was 
‘great disagreement among chronologues in counting the years from 
the Creation of the World to the death of our saviour’. Nevertheless, the 
scientific community of biblical chronologists agreed that ‘The sacred 
Writ is the best register’ for calculating the age of the earth or the world, 
as Allen wrote in his preface.30
Today the age of the earth is estimated to be 4.45 ± 0.05 billion 
years on the basis of evidence from radiometric age dating of meteorite 
material, which matches the ages of the oldest-known terrestrial and 
lunar samples. A  more precise estimate is difficult to obtain, because 
the accretion time of planet earth is unknown. Furthermore, the age of 
our universe, defined as the time elapsed since the postulated big bang 
event, is estimated 13.798 ± 0.037 billion years within the lambda-CDm 
concordance model on the basis of various types of measurements, 
such as measurements of the microwave background radiation and 
measurements of the expansion rate of the universe.31 For at least two 
reasons no well-informed intellectual will resort nowadays to biblical 
chronology in order to determine the age of the earth or of our universe.
28 Plantinga (2011: 10) discusses this example briefly.
29 Genesis 1:1-19.
30 Cf. for these data and quotes: Jackson (2006: 13-29).
31 estimate of 22 march 2013.
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First, in and after the 17th century Western scholars discovered 
other alleged religious revelations, on the basis of which very different 
ages of the earth or the universe might be calculated. For example, 
according to calculations informed by the Vedas, the current age 
of our universe would be in the order of magnitude of 155.5 trillion 
years. but if allegedly revealed religious texts contradict each other on 
specific topics, and if there are no good epistemic reasons to prefer one 
to the others, we should conclude that they aren’t reliable sources of 
knowledge concerning these topics, such as the time of divine creation, 
or the existence of specific gods.
secondly, a  great many empirical discoveries and theoretical 
developments in scientific disciplines such as geology, physics, biology, 
archaeology, and astronomy produced a consilience of inductions to the 
effect that both the earth and our universe are much older than biblical 
calculations suggested. The discovery of radioactivity by bequerel 
and others around 1900 enabled scientists to resolve the well-known 
contradiction between the calculation of the age of the solar system 
and the earth on the basis of thermal gradients by lord Kelvin on the 
one hand, and estimates of the time-span of the biological evolution 
on the other hand.32 moreover, this discovery enabled physicists to 
develop reliable methods for calculating the age of rocks on the basis 
of knowledge concerning the radioactive decay of radioactive isotopes.
reflecting on the history of the sciences from the 17th century onwards, 
taking this and myriad other examples into account, philosophers of 
science have attempted to characterize science in contradistinction to 
other cultural phenomena such as religion. Clearly, we should not define 
science in terms of specific scientific theories, because theories are fallible 
and may be superseded by better ones in the course of scientific progress. 
rather, science (in the broad sense of the German Wissenschaft, including 
historical research and other areas of scholarship) should be defined in 
methodological terms, as the search for factual truth by utilizing the best 
validated truth-conducive methods available at a time.33
32 Cf. Jackson (2006), Chapters 11, 13. Plantinga raises the temporal constraint problem 
for the evolution of the eye (2011: 23), but he mentions neither the interesting history of 
the problem nor relevant contemporary literature, such as Nilsson & Pelger (1994).
33 Whether science can be defined as a  search for true general theories is another 
matter. Cf. rowbottom (2010). Cf. also the extensive debate on Van Fraassen’s 
Constructive empiricism. Furthermore, if normative statements are truth-apt, we should 
exclude ultimate moral norms etc. from this definition.
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scientific method can be specified at various levels of abstraction in 
terms of sets of norms for correct epistemic procedures. At the highest 
level of abstraction, philosophers have attempted to specify rules of 
method that hold for all scientific and scholarly disciplines, while at the 
lowest level of particular topics of research, scientists will specify norms 
for the proper application of specific instruments or techniques, which 
typically are theory-laden. The general definition of science as the search 
for factual truth by utilizing the best validated truth-conducive methods 
available, might be elaborated by specifying rules at the highest level of 
abstraction.
In the context of this article, it will suffice to formulate one of these 
epistemic rules only, which, I propose, should be part of an elaborated 
characterization of science:
r(ule): Claims concerning specific disputed facts should be endorsed as 
(approximately, probably, etc.) true only if they are sufficiently supported 
by the application of validated methods of research or discovery.
Furthermore, one might specify in part what may be called a ‘scientific 
attitude’ (in the broad sense) by the following necessary condition:
s(cientific attitude): An individual has acquired a scientific attitude only 
if (s)he applies rule r to factual claims that are of importance for her/
him, or relies on testimonies of experts who applied rule r.
A few observations on validation will be useful in order to elucidate rule 
r. In some cases, the validation of methods of the search for truth is 
relatively easy, but in other cases, such as the validation of methods for 
calculating the age of rocks on the basis of knowledge concerning the 
radioactive decay of radioactive isotopes, validation is complex: it may 
take years and require the cooperation of many experts. but in general, 
there are at least three maxims to be applied in the validation of particular 
methods of research.
First (maxim 1), repeated and mutually independent applications 
of one and the same method should yield consistent and informative 
results. second (maxim 2), one should test whether various detection 
methods or instruments using different techniques yield the same 
result if applied to the same issue. This validation test is based upon 
an argument from coincidence. If very different processes of research, 
which have not much in common, produce identical results, it would be 
an unlikely coincidence if these results were artefacts of the methods or 
instruments rather than containing information about the item under 
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investigation. Finally (maxim 3), in the case of theory-laden methods and 
techniques, theoretical understanding of these methods and techniques 
may contribute decisively to (de-) validation, and of course the relevant 
theories should be well confirmed by various types of evidence.34
We may now define the profound conflict between science and 
religion as follows:
C(onflict): Adherents of religions, to the extent that they endorse positive 
factual claims to truth concerning supernatural entities such as gods, 
hell, heaven, angels, ghosts, immortal souls, etc., violate rule r, because 
typically these claims are not sufficiently supported by the application of 
validated methods of research or discovery.
Thesis C explains why most of us who really have acquired a scientific 
attitude, so that they satisfy s, will not endorse any positive assertion 
concerning the supernatural. They will feel strongly that such 
endorsements would violate their ethics of belief. of course, there 
are many aspects of religions apart from creeds or clusters of beliefs, 
such as rituals, architecture, forms of art, social organizations, dietary 
prescriptions, and moral norms, which may be valuable even if their 
creeds do not satisfy rule r. However, while the profound conflict C 
is primarily concerned with the doctrinal aspect of religions and its 
epistemic sources, it will also undermine these other aspects to the extent 
that the former underpin the latter.
religious apologists often claim that we should not compare the ways 
of acquiring their truths with scientific methods of research, because 
these ways are unique and differ essentially from scientific method.35 
but at the lowest level of abstraction, epistemic methods of discovery 
are essentially different in each scientific or scholarly sub-discipline as 
well. For example, physical methods for measuring the temperature in 
the centre of the sun are completely different from scholarly methods 
for detecting interpolations in ancient texts. so it will not help religious 
believers to stress that the ways of acquiring their truths are completely 
different from methods in scientific sub-disciplines. From the point of 
view of rule r, the crucial question is whether these religious ways of 
acquiring truths can be validated.
34 Cf. Philipse (2012), §6.2, and Hacking (1983), Chapter 11.
35 Cf. Plantinga (2011: 123-4): there would be a conflict ‘only if science tells us that 
beliefs in all the areas of our epistemic life ought to be formed and held in the same way 
as scientific beliefs typically are. but of course that isn’t a scientific claim at all; it is rather 
a normative epistemological claim, and a quixotic one at that’.
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What are the particular ways of acquiring (allegedly) true insights 
in the case of specific religions? The list is open-ended, but on the basis 
of scriptural analysis and anthropological research we should at least 
mention alleged revelations, such as the bible, the Vedas, or the book 
of mormon, the variety of religious experiences, alleged graces of gods, 
the interpretation of signs or signals or sacrifices, the averred effects of 
prayer, various kinds of ascetism such as fasting forty days in a desert, 
which may produce particular experiences, hearing voices in the absence 
of other human beings, a plethora of rituals, and humbly engaging in 
religious communities or practices.36
my contention is that none of these religious ways of discovering or 
receiving the truth has been validated, so that those who still endorse 
positive religious factual claims to truth on their basis violate rule r. even 
worse, it has been shown conclusively with regard to all of these ways that 
in general they are unreliable. For example, the various revelations that 
people pretend to have received from their god(s) contradict each other 
at many points (cf. maxim 1, above). beliefs that once were accepted 
on the basis of a  revelation, such as the conviction that God created 
the earth between 6000 and 2700 b.C., have been refuted by scientific 
research (cf. maxim 2). And the phenomenon of hearing voices in the 
absence of others, which occurred to important founders of religion 
such as Paul or mohammed, and which at the time could perhaps not be 
interpreted otherwise than as being due to the activity of invisible spirits 
or gods, is now accounted for within a  different and more scientific 
framework as typically being a  symptom of temporal lobe epilepsy, 
psychosis, schizophrenia, and other mental illnesses (cf. maxim 3), so 
that its religious importance has been disconfirmed.37
The example of biblical chronology shows well why the logical 
relations between scientific theories and articles of faith cannot be the 
main locus of the conflict (if any) between science and religion, although 
this is Plantinga’s focus in WCrl. Admittedly, many religious convictions 
based upon biblical texts, such as the doctrine of special creation still 
defended by William Paley in his Natural Theology of 1802, have been 
refuted by later scientific research. In all these cases, contradictions play 
a  role, because the religious conviction is contradicted (or rendered 
36 Cf. for a recent defence of this last option: moser (2010).
37 Cf. Philipse (2012), chapters 1 and 6.3 for a  more extended argument with 
references to scientific and scholarly literature. Incidentally: this is not a genetic fallacy; 
the underlying structure of the argument is bayesian.
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improbable) by the relevant scientific theory or result. but the majority 
of those who want to retain their religion will remove the contradiction 
by re-interpreting the relevant religious source, so that in many cases 
scientific progress has set the agenda for biblical re-interpretation.38 
Although fundamentalist creationists may stick to biblical chronology, 
more sophisticated Christians re-interpret the relevant biblical passages 
as figurative or as myths.39
let me round off this section by three comments. The first is 
concerned with the issue of defeaters. How can one defend the view that 
well-confirmed results of scientific research will not amount to defeaters 
for elements of ‘the full panoply of Christian belief in all its particularity’, 
if one also acknowledges that scientific progress has set the agenda 
for biblical reinterpretation? An enlightened Christian such as Alvin 
Plantinga seems to be confronted by a tension or even a contradiction at 
this point. I shall come back to the issue in section 5.
second, one might object to rule r that we all accept many factual 
beliefs which do not result from using validated methods of research 
or discovery, and that this is not only perfectly reasonable but also 
unavoidable. For example, what about the factual beliefs that we endorse 
on the basis of perception or testimony? Can we avoid assuming certain 
principles of credulity as fundamental principles of rationality, such 
as the rule that one is justified in believing what one takes oneself to 
perceive or have perceived unless there are defeating considerations?40 
surely, if all of us violate rule r continuously in daily life, it cannot be 
a valid objection to religious believers that they do so in endorsing their 
religious beliefs.
I would argue, however, that although it is true that we cannot but 
start with a  weak trust in our elementary epistemic sources, we are 
38 As is well known, re-interpretation may take some time. Heliocentrism contradicted 
many biblical texts in a  literalist interpretation, such as 1 Chronicles 16:30, Psalm 
93:1, Psalm 96:10, Psalm 104:5, Ecclesiastes 1:5, and, notably, Joshua 10:13. However, 
Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus and Galileo’s Dialogues did not disappear from the 
Catholic Index before 1835. And it was only in 1992 that a pope (John Paul II) finally 
vindicated Galileo (L’Osservatore Romano N. 44 (1264) – November 4, 1992).
39 one might justify this necessity of continuous biblical re-interpretation by stressing 
that a divine message is very difficult to interpret. Cf. Plantinga (2000: 383): ‘[g]iven that 
the bible is a communication from God to humankind, a divine revelation, there is much 
about it that requires deep and perceptive reflection, much that taxes our best scholarly 
and spiritual resources to the utmost.’
40 Cf. swinburne (2004: 303 ff.), and Philipse (2012: 317, note 23).
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validating them continually by applying implicitly the three maxims for 
validation mentioned above, so that usually our initial trust increases 
and is legitimized. For example, consecutive visual perceptions of the 
same thing confirm each other (maxim 1). When we move around in the 
world, our tactile perceptions typically corroborate the visual ones, and if 
they do not, we test our eyes (maxim 2). Finally, scientific understanding 
of light and sound explains that we hear a  distant collision later than 
we see it, for instance (maxim 3). We also continually and implicitly 
test our sense modalities by comparing what we perceive with what 
others observe, and the same holds for testimony, memory, and so on. 
Whenever our particular factual claims about the world are seriously 
disputed, we validate our sources explicitly. In short, our legitimate use 
of our senses, and our proper reliance on testimony or memory, is not an 
exception to rule r.41
Finally, it is often claimed that scientific methodology, including rule 
r, only applies to the natural universe, and not to the supernatural. The 
idea is that apart from the usual rules of method at the highest level 
of generality, there is yet another self-imposed constituting principle of 
science in a  broad sense, which is called methodological naturalism. 
According to the doctrine of methodological naturalism, a theory can be 
called ‘scientific’ only if it does not postulate supernatural entities, and 
by definition neither the data set nor the background knowledge used 
in testing scientific theories can include references to the supernatural.42 
If this conception of science were correct, one might aver that rule r 
does not apply to factual religious beliefs, because it is part of scientific 
methodology, which is naturalistic by definition.
However, as has been pointed out by many critics of this doctrine, 
naturalism is not an intrinsic constitutive principle of science, but 
rather a generalized result of many ages of scientific research, which is 
supported by an overwhelming consilience of inductions.43 Again and 
again, explanatory hypotheses that postulated supernatural entities or 
effects of supernatural agents have been superseded by superior natural 
41 Cf. Philipse (2012: 319). Incidentally, I would not consider the philosophical view 
of direct realism concerning sense perception (which I  endorse) as such a  ‘particular 
factual claim’, whereas a hypothesis of a deceiving demon (or brain surgeon) would be 
one. Hence, philosophical realists concerning sense perception do not violate rule r, 
whereas radical sceptics would do so.
42 Cf. Plantinga (2011: 168-174).
43 Cf. boudry et al. (2010); Coyne (2009); sober (2011), Ch. 4.
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explanations. To mention just one notorious example, the Newtonian 
assumption that the so-called Jupiter/saturn problem of the stability of 
the solar system had to be solved by postulating divine interventions was 
brilliantly refuted by laplace in 1786, when he solved the problem by 
subtle gravitational calculations.44 Given this consilience of inductions, 
scientists rightly concluded that it would be a waste of time to try out 
supernatural explanations again. To the extent that methodological 
naturalism is a norm of scientific method at all, it is a rule justified by 
empirical lessons of the past.
I  have argued in this section that by focussing on (alleged) logical 
conflicts between scientific theories or results and Christian doctrines, 
Plantinga overlooks the deep conflict between science and religion, 
which is concerned with the issue as to whether ways of discovering 
factual truths can be validated.45 This deep conflict consists in the fact 
that religious believers, to the extent that they endorse positive factual 
claims to truth concerning the supernatural, violate rule r. Can they 
avoid this conflict, or somehow resolve it?
IV. A DeCIsIoN Tree For THe FAITHFul: PlANTINGA’s oPTIoN
The spectacular scientific and scholarly progress during the last four 
centuries confronts religious believers with a crucial problem. because 
of its superior methods in the search for truth, science has displaced 
religion in most domains of modern life, such as medicine and psychiatry. 
Furthermore, the domain-specific alleged sources of truth of religions 
could not be validated, and their reliability has been contested on many 
grounds. How, then, can ‘educated and intelligent people living in the 
twenty-first century’ still reasonably endorse a religious creed?46
In their attempts to answer this question, contemporary philosophers 
of religion have developed an impressive variety of apologetic strategies, 
which may be classified under four main options. by schematizing these 
44 Cf. Hahn (2005), Chapter 5.
45 At the end of his fourth chapter, Plantinga mentions ‘a couple of other allegations 
of conflict between science and religion’, admitting that he doesn’t ‘have the space to 
do them justice’, although he indicates how his ‘reply to them might go’ (2000: 122). 
He briefly discusses John Worrall (2000), whose analysis of the ‘irreconcilable’ conflict 
between science and religion resembles mine to some extent. Plantinga’s brief criticisms 
of Worrall are either inadequate or do not apply to my account.
46 Plantinga (2000: viii).
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options as the end-nodes (b, d, e, and f) of a decision tree, which consists 
of three interlocked dilemmas, we see that they exhaust all logical 
possibilities. First, a religious believer might either (a) endorse a cognitive 
interpretation of (at least some parts of) a religious creed, and hold that 
religious statements such as ‘God created us in his image’ are factual 
truths, or (b) prefer a non-cognitive interpretation, according to which 
the relevant religious creed does not contain any positive factual claim 
to truth concerning the supernatural. second, the religious believer who 
opts for (a) in the first dilemma might endorse either (c) evidentialism, 
the view that convincing evidence and arguments are needed in order 
to endorse reasonably a  religious claim to truth, or (d) the negation 
of evidentialism, according to which such evidence or arguments may 
not be necessary. Finally, those who accept (c) might hold that from 
a (methodo-) logical point of view the evidence and arguments that may 
justify a religious claim to truth are either (e) completely different from 
scientific arguments, or (f) similar to scientific arguments, for example 
because they can be formulated in terms of bayes’ theorem.47
Those who opt for end-node (b), whether developed as stephen Jay 
Gould’s NomA thesis or by (re-) interpreting the ‘deep grammar’ of the 
religious language game à la D. Z. Phillips, will not violate rule r, because 
they do not endorse any religious claim to factual truth.48 However, they 
pay a  high price for this advantage of instant immunization against 
factual criticisms. by eliminating all factual claims concerning the 
supernatural from their creed, they will be at a loss to explain what can 
legitimize their ‘magisterium’ of religious meaning and values. one may 
sympathize with religious apologists such as Plantinga, then, who prefer 
(a) because they want to be religious believers in a substantial sense.
by opting for (a), Plantinga is landed in the second dilemma between 
evidentialism (c) and its denial (d). As is well known, Plantinga not only 
criticized incisively various versions of evidentialism in his works from 
his 1982 paper ‘The reformed objection to Natural Theology’ onwards, 
an endeavour that culminated in his summa Warranted Christian Belief of 
2000. He also holds that (argumentative) evidentialism as an apologetic 
strategy is bound to fail. As he says, ‘I don’t know of an argument for 
Christian belief that seems very likely to convince one who doesn’t 
47 Cf. Philipse (2012) for a  critical analysis of the most promising philosophical 
elaborations of each of these options.
48 Cf. Gould (1999) and Phillips (2005).
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already accept its conclusion’.49 I  presume that he would say the same 
thing with regard to cumulative case strategies of arguing for theism, 
such as richard swinburne’s. Consequently, Plantinga chose to develop 
end-node (d) of the decision tree for religious apologists.
According to Plantinga’s version of (d), ‘the full panoply of Christian 
belief, including trinity, incarnation, atonement, resurrection’ can, ‘if 
true, have warrant, can indeed have sufficient warrant for knowledge’ 
without being supported by any evidence or arguments, because it might 
consist of properly basic beliefs.50 In order to show that this can be the 
case, Plantinga developed his ‘Aquinas/Calvin’ or A/C model of religious 
knowledge, according to which God, if he exists, probably has implanted 
in all human beings a specific epistemic module, the sensus divinitatis, 
which, if functioning properly, gives us the relevant religious knowledge 
in the basic way, that is, without the need for evidence or arguments.
since Plantinga’s model is ‘epistemically possible’ only if its description 
is consistent with everything we know, he has to extend the model in 
such a way that it accounts for the fact that most humans have not been, 
and are not, believing Christians.51 In his (2000), Plantinga does so by 
incorporating some Christian dogmas into the model, such as original 
sin, which has ‘ruinous cognitive consequences’, and salvation by Christ.52 
Indeed, Plantinga avers that by an ‘Internal Instigation’ the Holy spirit 
might seal the gift of faith upon the hearts of (some?) Christians, while 
nonbelievers suffer from the cognitive consequences of original sin.53 
let us now wonder whether Plantinga’s theory of religious knowledge 
enables him to avoid, or resolve, the various conflicts between science 
and religion.
V. THe CoNFlICT Is NeITHer AVoIDeD Nor resolVeD
In order to investigate whether Plantinga succeeds in resolving the conflict 
between science and religion, two sub-questions should be addressed, on 
the assumption that Plantinga’s externalist model of religious knowledge 
is an adequate one. First (1), can religious believers legitimately neutralize 
scientific defeaters of their beliefs, so that logical conflicts between 
49 Plantinga (2000: 201).
50 Plantinga (2000: 357).
51 Plantinga (2000: 168-9) (Plantinga’s italics).
52 Plantinga (2000: 205) (Plantinga’s italics).
53 Plantinga (2000: 206 and passim).
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science and religion are only ‘weak’ in the sense defined in §2? second 
(2), can religious believers avoid violating rule r, so that the deep conflict 
between science and religion as defined in §3 is removed?
Concerning sub-question (1), it will be obvious to most of us that 
religious believers cannot, and indeed have not, neutralized well-
established scientific defeaters of their beliefs. Take, for example, the 
traditional Christian belief that God created all species as they are now 
(special creation). From the 17th century onwards, the accumulating 
data of the fossil record, combined with geological knowledge and much 
later with various scientific dating methods, showed convincingly that 
evolution is a  fact, and that species developed over time by descent 
with modification. Accordingly, this immense reservoir of evidence 
contradicts the traditional Christian view, and constitutes a  rebutting 
defeater for an element of the ‘full panoply of Christian belief ’. Christians 
may, and indeed have, removed this defeater by reinterpreting their creed 
(cf. §2). but this merely shows that even in their eyes scientific methods 
are more reliable than, for instance, a divine revelation as interpreted by 
theologians. How can one still trust one’s belief that, for example, God 
created humans in his image, or that Christ was resurrected, if such beliefs 
are produced by a source, a revelation as interpreted by theologians, that 
proved to be unreliable so many times?
Given these considerations, the reader will be interested to learn how 
Plantinga argues for the opposite view. As he says, ‘science that produces 
theories incompatible with Christian belief [...] would certainly not 
constitute a defeater for Christian belief ’.54 His argument goes as follows. 
First, using an allusion that may escape secular readers, Plantinga calls 
scientific theories incompatible with Christian belief ‘simonian science’.55 
second, he argues that simonian science is based upon methodological 
naturalism, at least in typical cases. This means not only that properly 
scientific explananda, or the data set to be explained, cannot contain 
54 Plantinga (2011: 174, cf. 177).
55 Plantinga (2011: 164, 173-5, 186-9, and passim). officially, the expression ‘simonian 
science’ alludes to Herbert simon, who explained the altruistic behaviour of mother 
Teresa and other Christian saints with reference to the hypothetical mental mechanisms 
of ‘docility’ and ‘bounded rationality’ (cf. Plantinga 2011: 134-6). but I suspect that the 
adjective ‘simonian’ also refers to simon the magician of Acts 8:1-24, who converted 
to Christianity although his heart was ‘not right before God’, as Peter said (vs. 21), or 
perhaps to simon the leper (Matthew 26:6-13 and Mark 14:3-9), who according to some 
was healed from his leprosy by Jesus.
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supernatural entities, and that the explanans, or the explaining theory, 
should not postulate such entities either, but also that the set of relevant 
background beliefs with reference to which we determine the prior 
probability of our explanations, cannot contain religious beliefs.56 
Plantinga calls the set of these background beliefs the ‘evidence base’ of 
an explanation.57 He then argues that in cases of simonian science, the 
scientific theories that contradict Christian beliefs may have a very high 
prior probability given the scientific evidence base, but that this prior 
probability might be very low given the evidence base of the Christian, 
which incorporates the full panoply of Christian belief. And if the prior 
probability of simonian theories will be very low given the evidence base 
of Christians, such theories cannot constitute defeaters for Christian 
beliefs. As Plantinga says:
I submit that the same goes for simonian science and Christian belief. 
The evidence base for simonian science (...) is part of the Christian’s 
evidence base, but only part of it. Hence, the fact that simonian science 
comes to conclusions incompatible with Christian belief doesn’t provide 
the believer with a defeater for her belief.58
of course, it would be absurd to argue that scientific discoveries could 
never defeat any of the supernatural beliefs held by Christians. For 
example, Plantinga admits that scientific results and methods have 
refuted the view that God created the earth a few thousand years bCe. 
He avers, however, that this view is ‘not part of Christian belief as 
such’.59 Attempting to develop a  ‘nontrivial test for determining when 
we get a defeater’ for Christian beliefs, he suggests on the basis of his 
A/C model of faith that, first, if this model applies, faith has a warrant 
at least as strong as perceptual beliefs, which often function as intrinsic 
neutralizers of defeaters, and, second, that biblical beliefs can only be 
defeated by simonian science if ‘there are other perfectly plausible ways 
of construing’ the relevant biblical passage.60 For clearly, if God is the 
ultimate author of the bible, as Plantinga holds, everything contained in 
it must be true, if properly interpreted.
56 Plantinga (2011: 171-173).
57 Plantinga (2011: 167-8).
58 Plantinga (2011: 177). Cf. p. 189: ‘The mere existence of simonian science – science 
that comes to conclusions incompatible with tenets of the Christian faith  – has no 
tendency to produce a defeater for those tenets.’
59 Plantinga (2011: 144, note 23, cf. 10).
60 Plantinga (2011: 186, 188).
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one should admit to Plantinga that if the Christian god exists, He 
might have infused Christian believers with the full panoply of Christian 
belief, and one might admit for the sake of argument that if believers 
really acquired their beliefs by such an Internal Instigation of the Holy 
spirit (IIHs), this alleged source of knowledge might be  – like sense 
perception is  – an intrinsic neutralizer of many defeaters.61 but these 
two ‘ifs’ are crucial. by calling the background beliefs with reference 
to which we assess the prior probability of theories, the ‘evidence base’, 
and by claiming that the evidence base of the simonian scientist is 
simply a sub-set of the evidence base of Christians, because the former 
is restricted by methodological naturalism, Plantinga suggests that all 
these background beliefs have the same legitimate status, and that the 
two ‘ifs’ are satisfied.
However, as I  argued above (§3), naturalism is not an arbitrary 
methodological restriction of our scientific evidence base. rather, 
it is supported by a  convincing consilience of inductions drawn from 
science in the past. Furthermore, disputed factual background beliefs 
can legitimately belong to our evidence base only if they result from 
validated sources of knowledge, as rule r says. Hence, Plantinga’s view 
that simonian science ‘has no tendency to produce a  defeater’ for 
tenets of Christian faith would be correct only if these tenets are really 
produced by divine grace, or by an IIHs, that is, if at least these two 
‘ifs’ are satisfied.62 In order to know that the view is correct, one would 
have to show that such basic beliefs are properly basic by validating their 
source of knowledge. only if this can be done will religious believers not 
violate rule r (cf. question 2).63
but how might one validate an alleged divine grace or IIHs? let me 
consider three possible methods of validation. First, if the Christian 
god exists, he might have infused with the full panoply of Christian 
belief tribes of which one can show that they were never influenced, 
directly or indirectly, by intercultural contacts with Christianity. If 
anthropologists found such a  tribe, and if this tribe endorsed the full 
panoply of Christian belief, a secular explanation of their beliefs would 
have a much lower likelihood than the Christian explanation, and this 
might validate Plantinga’s model to some extent. but the immense 
61 Cf. for an argument against this latter claim: Philipse (2012), §4.3.
62 Cf. Plantinga (2011: 189).
63 The validation requirement of rule r is internalistic in the epistemological sense, 
whereas Plantinga’s model of religious knowledge is externalistic.
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amount of anthropological research, done during the last four centuries, 
has not yielded such a  result. second, one might test whether alleged 
divine grace infuses people of different cultures with the same messages, 
such as polytheistic Hindus and mormons. Clearly, this is not the case, 
and the messages often contradict each other, unless one relativizes 
them drastically à la John Harwood Hick.64 Third, one might validate an 
alleged IIHs by showing on the basis of public evidence that, probably, 
the Christian god exists, so that, probably, the A/C model applies. 
However, Plantinga correctly holds that this cannot be done, even though 
he avers that the argument from fine-tuning may ‘offer non-negligible 
evidence for theistic belief ’.65 It follows that Plantinga’s model of religious 
knowledge acquisition has not been, and probably cannot be, validated.
The deep conflict between science and religion (§3) amounts to the 
de jure objection against religious believers that, to the extent that they 
endorse positive factual claims to truth concerning the supernatural, the 
sources of their beliefs have not been validated, so that they violate rule 
r. since this de jure objection also applies to Plantinga’s hypothetical 
A/C & IIHs model of religious belief, and does not depend upon the de 
facto objection that the Christian god does not exist, Plantinga’s religious 
epistemology does not resolve the profound conflict between science 
and religion.66
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